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Information technology security policies are designed explicitly to protect IT systems. 
However, overly restrictive information security policies may be inadvertently creating an 
unforeseen information risk by encouraging users to bypass protected systems in favor of 
personal devices, where the potential loss of organizational intellectual property is greater. 
Organizations that implement overly restrictive web filtering, website blocking, and other 
security measures to protect the integrity of their information systems are likely introducing a 
risk that sensitive or protected information will be processed on personal devices, outside of the 
organizational framework, as users identify the most efficient and effective way to accomplish 
work-related tasks unimpeded.  
Current models regarding the acceptance and use of technology, primarily TAM3 and 
UTAUT2, address the use of technology in organizations and by consumers, but little research 
has been done to identify an appropriate model to begin to understand what factors would 
influence users that can choose between using their own personal device and using 
organizational IT assets, separate and distinct from “bring your own device” constructs. This 
research aims to bridge that divide by identifying the factors that influence users to select their 
own device to overcome organizational restrictions in order to accomplish their work. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Insider threats have existed for millennia, acknowledged in the earliest known writings, 
including in the histories of Herodotus of Halicarnassus where he described Greek spies being 
spared by Xerxes (Herodotus and Grene 1987). Sun Tzu also recognized insider threats in his 
famous treatise On the Art of War, where he identified five classes of spies, including “having 
local spies means employing the services of the inhabitants of a district” and “having inward 
spies, making use of officials of the enemy” (Sawyer and Sawyer 1994). Insider threats are 
nothing new, but the vastness of information that can be compromised by one trusted insider has 
increased exponentially since the advent of the information age. Indeed, Bickers (2000), cited the 
potential loss of company information as a restraining factor for companies when first 
contemplating e-commerce in the late 1990s and 2000s.  
  Despite the multitude of historical examples, research into insider threats to information 
systems has long been neglected in favor of the perceived threats posed by external factors, such 
as viruses, worms, hackers, and others. This general trend continues, with recent research by 
Beckett (2015) indicating that while organizations have doubled their spending to protect 
themselves against the loss of information and systems, the vast majority of spending has been 
used to harden systems against external threats. One potential reason for this divide is the lack of 
reliable data concerning insider threats, as organizations aim to minimize the damage caused by 
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malicious insiders in order to limit their exposure to the secondary and tertiary effects of losses 
(Bulgurcu et al. 2010; Pfleeger and Stolfo 2009). 
Despite the focus on systems and processes for identifying threats to information systems 
against external threats, and the recognition of the threats posed by malicious insiders, there has 
been little study or effort to identify ways in which critical information can be exposed by non-
malicious insiders who use personal devices to conduct work related tasks outside of the 
organizational information systems infrastructure. 
Management and organizational restrictions regarding Internet usage within large 
organizations are common. Within agencies of the U.S. government (Department of Defense 
2012), these restrictions impede the ability of intelligence analysts to conduct Internet based 
research, known as “open source” research (Glassman and Kang 2012). These restrictions 
include prohibitions on “viewing, storage, copying or transmission of materials related 
to…illegal weapons, terrorist activities or any other illegal activities or activities otherwise 
prohibited” (Frederick 2014). Offensive, prohibited and resource intensive websites, such as 
video and audio streaming services, are frequently blocked by web filtering tools. These 
restrictions are specifically applicable to the unofficial use of IT systems, allowing for access to 
these materials and subjects for official purposes, but through practice and design, there are 
limited methods to differentiate between official and unofficial use except in ex post facto 
reviews (Frederick 2014).   
Consequently, intelligence analysts that wish to avoid lengthy review processes in which 
they have to justify accessing prohibited content, or burdensome processes required for 
requesting permission in advance, may choose to forego accessing potentially problematic 
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materials while using government systems, opting instead to use personal devices and networks 
to access information.  
PROBLEM STATEMENT 
Organizations that impose significant restrictions on Internet use increase the likelihood 
that employees will use personal devices to conduct work related tasks, escalating information 
security risks (Gundu and Flowerday 2012; Hovav and Putri 2016). The use of web filters and 
other information technology approaches to limit the accessibility of potentially inflammatory, 
objectionable, or ostensibly non work-related websites are largely effective in reducing employee 
misuse of information technology resources (Glassman et al. 2015); however, when access to 
Internet resources that are necessary to accomplishing work related tasks are restricted, these 
constraints may encourage employees to bypass organizational constraints by using their own 
devices and networks to access Internet based information. The use of personal devices and 
Internet resources to conduct work related activities increase the risk of information compromise 
(Garba, Armarego, Murray, et al. 2015; Hovav and Putri 2016). Previous studies examining how 
and when people use technology have largely approached the issue in a bifurcated manner, 
examining the use of technology in organizations and by consumers as discrete and separate  
(Venkatesh et al. 2012; Venkatesh and Bala 2008). This study aims to bridge the gap between 
these two approaches by examining the factors that influence the behavioral intention and use 
behavior of technology when employees can bypass organizational restrictions by using personal 
devices to accomplish work related tasks, potentially exposing sensitive information.  
Research Goal and Significance 
The purpose of this research is to investigate whether internet usage restrictions influence 
intelligence analysts to conduct open source research on personal devices, which can lead to 
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organizational harm including potentially exposing confidential information to adversaries 
(Fleischer et al. 2018; Fredericks 2018; Timberg 2018).   
Recent discoveries of advanced intelligence collection systems near U.S. intelligence and 
defense facilities, known colloquially as “IMSI catchers” and “Stingrays”, which act as a man in 
the middle attack on cellular telephones and devices, allowing for the interception and collection 
of both voice and data, lend credence to the concept that unwitting use of personal devices may 
expose information (Fleischer et al. 2018; Fredericks 2018; Timberg 2018). As a result, 
employees who fully comply with applicable restrictions while operating enterprise IT systems 
may unknowingly expose critical information by conducting research using personal equipment 
such as at home or using mobile devices.  
The use of personal devices, including such generally benign devices like fitness trackers, 
have been used to reveal confidential and sensitive information (Ching and Singh 2016; Lidynia 
et al. 2017). In 2018, a security flaw in a mobile fitness application revealed “6,400 users 
believed to be exercising at sensitive locations, including the NSA, the White House, MI6 in 
London, and the Guantanamo Bay detention center in Cuba, as well as personnel working on 
foreign military bases” (Whittaker 2018). In another example, the location of U.S. military 
personnel engaged in combat operations in Syria and Afghanistan were revealed through another 
fitness tracking device (Sly 2018). While these incidents did not violate organizational policies 
(Sisk 2018), nor did they involve organizational information systems, they nevertheless, and 
apparently entirely inadvertently, exposed highly sensitive information to potential adversaries.   
There have been extensive studies evaluating how, when, and why users accept and use 
technology. The two primary competing models reflect the differences between the 
organizational use of technology and how consumers use technology. The primary model used to 
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understand how technology is used within organizations is known as the Technology Acceptance 
Model 3 (TAM3)  (Venkatesh and Bala 2008), which includes antecedents such as voluntariness 
as well as perceptions of external control.  Recognizing that models developed to understand 
how users accept technology they are required to use for employment is fundamentally different 
from technology users choose for themselves, a separate model known as UTAUT2 was 
developed  (Venkatesh et al. 2012). UTAUT2 is similar in many ways to TAM3 but reflects the 
unique influences that individual choice has on using technology, such as incorporating age, 
gender, and experience as moderating factors. While TAM3 is well suited to evaluating 
technology acceptance in organizations, UTAUT2 is better suited and designed to accomplish 
the same for individual consumers. The TAM3 and UTAUT2 models represent the current state 
of acceptance theory in information systems. 
Addressing both technical violations that are inadvertent, as well as those committed 
maliciously or with reckless disregard for the potential consequences has long been a challenge 
when developing appropriate definitions for insider threats (Loch et al. 1992). Brackney and 
Anderson (2004) proposed one of the foundational definitions of what constitutes an insider 
threat in the context of information assurance concerns: “malevolent (or possibly inadvertent) 
actions by an already trusted person with access to sensitive information and information 
systems” (p. 9). Significant research has been conducted regarding the implementation and 
effectiveness of internet use policies, web filtering tools, formal and informal control 
mechanisms and sanctions, and behavioral and motivational pressures, all which have 
undoubtably decreased misuse of information technology systems. However, there is limited 
research as to what effect these policies have on users avoiding using provided information 
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systems, instead choosing to more efficiently access information on personal devices, 
representing a potential insider threat in regards to the loss of information. 
Integral to the choice of users selecting personal devices instead of organizational IT 
resources, is the concept of privacy. Sometimes also referred to as trust, privacy has been 
approached in a number of ways within the literature, including as a contextual relationship 
within the existing UTAUT2 and TAM3 models, specifically as part of adoption beliefs such as 
effort expectancy and facilitating conditions (Venkatesh et al. 2011), but generally not as an 
independent moderating factor. Other works, such as Dinev, McConnell and Smith’s (2015) 
expanded Antecedents–Privacy Concerns–Outcomes (APCO) approach recognizes the impact 
privacy plays in individuals’ choices, which is not reflected in current technology acceptance 
models. The confluence of privacy, user acceptance of technology, as well as security is partially 
addressed in the various evolutions of technology acceptance models. However, there is little 
understanding or study of what influences users to choose between organizational resources, 
such as those modeled and described in TAM3, and the use of personal devices, which UTAUT2 
models for consumers. 
Conceptually, this paper will attempt to bridge the gap between TAM3 and UTAUT2 by 
examining what factors influence users to select personal devices over organizational systems to 
accomplish work related tasks. Additionally, this research will incorporate the impact that the 
perception of privacy has on the behavioral intention and use behavior of employees to avoid use 
restrictions and other barriers to free access of the Internet. This proposed research model 
incorporates selected constructs as antecedents to behavioral intention and use behavior inspired 
by the TAM3 and UTAUT2 models to investigate what effect organizational policies as well as 
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the impact the perception of privacy has on users selecting between organizational resources and 
personal devices to conduct work related activities. 
The use of personal devices and systems to accomplish work related information 
gathering tasks likely does not pose a direct threat to information systems of an organization, 
however, the use of extra-organizational resources, such as personally owned smart phones or 
home computers, may introduce unintended risks to sensitive information (Garba, Armarego, and 
Murray 2015). Intelligence analysts provide a unique social milieu in which to examine the 
factors influencing personal device usage, as they are prohibited by law and policy from 
possessing or using personal devices within their work spaces (National Counterintelligence and 
Security Center 2017). This allows for a clear demarcation between organizational IT devices 
and other situations wherein personal devices are not provided by the organization but authorized 
for use, such as is the case with BYOD (Hovav and Putri 2016). 
By gaining a fuller understanding of the prevalence of personal device usage, as well as 
the impact organizational policies has on personal device use behavior, organizations can make 
informed decisions as to what Internet use policies are appropriate and develop remediation 
strategies to mitigate risks. 
Approach 
In order to develop empirical support within a framework inspired by UTAUT2/TAM3, 
this study will employ an exploratory quantitative research design conducted in three phases. 
During the first phase, the survey instrument will be developed following a review of literature 
and validated against a panel of experts using the Delphi method. The Delphi method is 
generally considered a quick, inexpensive, and relatively efficient method to ensure consensus 
regarding a topic or process that require individual judgements (Powell 2003). The survey 
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instrument will be developed based on validated scales from previous studies, which according 
to Hair (2010), is consistent with established best practices. A pre-test will be used to increase 
confidence and fit (Oksenberg and Kalton 1991) and will be examined to minimize issues related 
to instrument validity, including content and construct validity as well as reliability as identified 
by Straub (1989). 
In the final phase, following the development of the survey instrument and validation, an 
online survey will be provided to members of the United States Intelligence Community through 
a variety of platforms, with the goal of receiving ~500 valid responses.  This survey will be 
submitted for approval for distribution through the Office of the Director of National Intelligence 
for posting on US government systems to increase the quality and quantity of responses. 
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